In this paper, we study the empirical relationship between credit funding sources and the nancial vulnerability of the Colombian banking system. We propose a statistical model to measure and predict banking-fragility episodes associated with credit funding sources classied into retail deposits and wholesale funds. We compute the probability of nancial fragility for both the aggregated banking system and the individual banks. Our approach performs a Bayesian averaging of estimated logit regression models with monthly balance sheet data between 1996 and 2013. The results show the increasing use of wholesale funding to support credit expansion is a potential source of nancial fragility. Therefore, monitoring credit funding sources could provide an additional tool to warn against banking disruptions.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in mid-2007, topics concerning nancial stability have gained importance in both the theory and the practice of macroprudential policy. An understanding of issues such as the funding structure of bank lending, the role of leverage, the determinants of credit cycles and the identication of credit booms have become crucial subjects for authorities, given their aim of anticipating and avoiding nancial crises. These themes are particularly relevant in emerging economies where periods of rapid expansion in credit could arise diverse fragilities in the nancial system. Literature on nancial stability has studied extensively the dynamics of credit, the measurement of the nancial cycle and its relationship to banking crises (e.g. Gourinchas et al. (2001) , Cerra and Saxena (2008) , Jordá and Taylor (2012) , Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Borio (2012) ). One particular branch of this literature examines the existing relationship between credit cycles and macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Hume and Sentance (2009) , Bordo and Haubrich (2010) , Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) , Claessens and Terrones (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2013) ).
Furthermore, recent literature on this topic has concentrated on the construction of early warning indicators of lending booms, nancial fragility and banking crises (e.g. Goldstein and Reinhart (2000) , Frankel and Saravelos (2010) , Drehmann et al. (2012) , Guarin et al. (2014) and Greenwood and D. (2012) ). In general, these indicators are built using nancial data from the assets side of the balance sheet (i.e. the resources nancial system intermediaries lend to rms and households) and information on macroeconomic variables.
Lately, there is a burgeoning literature that associates both credit cycle and nancial stability to the dynamics of the funding sources the banking system uses for lending (e.g. Damar and Terajima (2010) , Huang and Ratnovski (2010) , Shin (2011), Hahm et al. (2012) and ). According to this literature, in periods of rapid credit growth, the traditional funding sources (i.e. retail deposits from savers or coreliabilities) are not enough to cover the demand for bank lending. As a result, banks make use of funding sources other than traditional retail deposits (wholesale funds or non-core liabilities). Shin and Shin (2011) , and highlight that, in emerging economies with open capital markets (e.g. Korea), short-term foreign obligations and interbank loans are relevant sources of non-core liabilities. Moreover, their increasing use raises the vulnerability of nancial institutions. Except for Korea, empirical analysis on this subject in emerging economies has been limited. Nevertheless, Korea is a particular case among emerging countries, because its nancial system is large and highly globalized, and the main wholesale funds come from foreign creditors. However, for the case of less open economies, like Colombia, other types of wholesale funds such as bonds, institutional deposits made by other intermediaries and interbank operations could be predominant. and note that the composition of bank liabilities provides valuable signals on lending booms, nancial fragility and banking crises.
In fact, large holdings of wholesale funds increase the willingness of the banking system 3 to face greater risk exposure. Hence, the extent of wholesale liabilities could reect the phase of the nancial cycle and the degree of vulnerability to setbacks. Figure 1 depicts the banking sector balance sheet before and after a credit boom. Clearly, this picture outlines the buildup of vulnerabilities associated with growth in wholesale funds.
Figure 1. Lending Boom Financed by Wholesale Funds
Source: Adapted from Bearing in mind the previous discussion, the main objective of this paper is to study the empirical relationship between credit funding sources and the vulnerability of the Colombian banking system. From this crucial link, we propose a monitoring tool based on predictions of the probability of nancial fragility. In particular, the empirical exercise estimates the probability of being in a situation of banking fragility as a function of the credit funding sources. The econometric exercises carry out a Bayesian averaging of logistic regression models that express a nancial risk index in terms of retail deposits and wholesale funds. Our index aggregates four distinct risks: credit, protability, solvency and liquidity. The estimations are perfomed using monthly Colombian data from the balance sheet for the entire banking sector and 12 individual banks between 1996 and 2013.
The results show the increasing use of wholesale funds, particularly to support credit expansion, entails potential elements of risk and, hence, episodes of banking fragility.
Within them, foreign credit, interbank operations and securities redemption are relevant factors to identify most of such episodes. Therefore, monitoring credit funding sources becomes an essential tool in a macroprudential scenario to prevent events of nancial crisis.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts of the dynamics of credit and its funding sources. Section 3 explains the construction of our measure of nancial fragility, while Section 4 goes into the details of the econometric strategy. In Section 5, we perform the empirical exercises and present the results. Finally, Section 6 oers some conclusions. We suggest nancial fragility can be explained by credit funding sources. To illustrate this point, we adapt the Shin and Shin (2011) framework by starting with a simple accounting scheme traced from the balance sheet. Let us begin by dening the agents of the nancial system as borrowers (domestic enterprises and households), creditors (households who oer retail deposits), banks (who channel resources from creditors to borrowers), and other creditors (additional local and external intermediaries), whose function is to provide funds (wholesale funds) to the local banking sector.
We adopt the assumptions that there exist n local banks (indexed by 1, 2, 3, . . . , n), and that the domestic-household creditor sector is represented by n + 1. The other creditors sector (i.e. other domestic and external intermediaries) is indexed by (n + 2). Bank i has three types of assets: loans to nal users (y i ), a portfolio in domestic securities (s i ), and loans to other creditors, who may be agencies within the banking sector itself and/or other intermediaries (local and foreign). The interbanking assets are noted by x j π ji , where x j represents the total debt of bank j y π ji is the share of bank j 's debt held by bank i. Notice therefore that π j,n+1 is the share of the bank's liabilities held by the household-creditor sector (e.g. in the form of retail deposits ), while π j,n+2 is the share of the bank's liabilities held by other-creditors (e.g. in the form of wholesale funds ). As long as the agents n+1 and n+2 do not use leverage, then x n+1 = x n+2 = 0.
The balance sheet identity of bank i is given by
(1) which means the total assets (left-hand side of (1)) are equal to debt (x i ) plus equity (e i ). 1
We can aggregate the set of banks and reorder the variables so that Equation (1) can be expressed as
The resources in x i can be broken down into retail deposits rd i and wholesale liabilities wl i . Equation (2) is rewritten as
Considering the interbanking liabilities which are, implicitly, within the wholesale liabilities and the interbanking assets, both on the right side of Equation (3), we can 1 Note that for i=j, the interbank assets are equal to zero. x j π ji ) so that Equation (3) becomes
Retail Deposits and Wholesale Funds
The left-hand side of (4) represents the total loans to nal users granted by the banking system. The available funding sources are described on the right-hand side. Shin and Shin (2011) point out that nancial fragility is associated with credit funding sources, and retail deposits are typically the most important ones. However, as mentioned previously, in periods of credit booms, that source is not enough to nance the bank's loans. Accordingly, banks seek to access to so-called wholesale funds from other types of agents (local and external intermediaries). Beyond recent literature has emphasized, we wish to call attention to another possible source of loan funding. It amounts to the redemption of investments in the case of banks that hold securities in their portfolios.
It should be noted that additional sources of loans funding could come from equity, particularly from the resources that exceeded the required reserve levels. We will show in the next section that banking risks could be exacerbated when loans (y) are increasing rapidly, thereby expanding banking vulnerability. Since y is highly correlated to risks, especially in credit booms, we will employ the right side of equation (4) to assess banking vulnerability.
We break down the total liabilities on the balance sheet into two groups of resources; namely, retail deposits and wholesale funds. In principle, retail deposits are the liabilities of a bank with non-bank domestic creditors. International evidence shows these funds are both the predominant source of banks' funding and the ones that grow in line with the aggregate wealth of households ; Shin and Shin (2011) ). The items contained within could follow the traditional criteria for classications of monetary aggregates, which focus on the role of money as a medium of exchange. Therefore, retail funds include demand deposits, savings deposits, term deposits with dierent maturities, and small remaining deposits.
From a nancial vulnerability perspective the distinction between retail and wholesale funding for banks is not captured suciently by the ease at which transactions are settled. Shin and Shin (2011) and recommend considering other classication criteria that deal with who holds the claims, particularly to properly understand the role of wholesale liabilities. The new approach implies to move toward a market-based nancial system instead of deposit-based funding. For example, overnight repurchase agreements (repos) between nancial institutions are a case of claims that are short-term and highly liquid, with very dierent systemic implications. In terms of liquidity, at the other extreme, there are long-term bonds issued by banks that are acquired (typically, but not exclusively) by institutional investors. Left panel presents the dynamics of the funding sources while right panel shows the composition of retail deposits.
For Colombia, the wholesale funds will consist largely of bond emissions, institutional deposits from other intermediaries (e.g. deposits from second-tier banks), foreign credit, and interbank short-term liabilities (repos and other operations). Bond emissions are used normally to nance projects for the banks themselves, but also could eventually fund loans to third parties. Foreign credits correspond to resources for commercial credit, while interbank operations correspond to exceedingly short-term operations (intraday operations to cover liquidity shortfalls).
We use the balance sheet of the Colombian banking system, as provided by The Financial Service´s Authority (Superintendencia Financiera), to analyse the banks' sources of funding. Specically, our data set contains monthly information from December 1996
to March 2013 at two levels: the aggregate banking system and individual banks. We select a subset of 12 banks, while the total banking sector includes information on 25 banks. The 12 individual banks were selected due to availability of data for the entire sample period. Annex A summarizes the set of all credit funding sources, the denition of each one and its specic source, while Annex B reports the descriptive statistics of this set of variables. Left panel shows the components of the wholesale funds while right panel presents the dynamics of this funding source compared to that of the total credit. 
Funding Through Securities
An alternative source of bank loan funding comes from the use of securities in the case of banks that hold important amounts of these assets. Why banks hold nancial securities has to do with reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is reasonable to think that, while it is typical for banks to re-balance their risks by granting loans at dierent maturities and across diverse activities, in practice, they also could do so by For a closer look at these issues, the right-side panel of Figure 4 shows the dynamics of investment in sovereign bonds; namely, TES (the main securities bought by banks) versus total loans (both as share of total assets). We want to illustrate the clearly opposite trends of these two assets of the banking system, i.e. the banking system presumably uses resources from the sale of xed-income investments to provide loans. Thus, while loans decreased progressively in the rst part of the 2000s, the investments of banks in treasury securities increased. As we noted earlier, the trends change abruptly at the mid2000s, when credit began to increase and, simultaneously, investments fell. There is no doubt the asset recomposition of banks registered in the second part of the 2000s was due to a change in strategic policy such that the redemption of sovereign securities could be used to fund new loans. The central bank report of March 2007 recognized these facts.
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International evidence indicating that commercial banks increasingly borrow wholesale funds to supplement traditional retail deposits has been also attributed to the competition for household savings from alternative investment agencies such as mutual funds, life insurance products, etc. (Huang and Ratnovski (2010) ). Literature based on recent events in the United States and Europe also emphasizes that banks can use wholesale 9 funds to expand lending, which could end up compromising credit quality Agur (2013) .
The hypothesis we explore in this paper is that wholesale funds can increase the fragility of banks, especially in phases of high credit expansion. However, an empirical evaluation rst requires dening the concept of nancial fragility.
Financial Fragility
To characterize nancial vulnerability empirically, we constructed a single indicator that collects most of the risks to which a bank is exposed. This indicator takes the form of a dummy variable and tries to identify periods in which a particular key risk, or some of them, generates an eventual warning situation for banks. As we will see in Section 4, this exercise is a crucial step in the development of our empirical strategy. The indicator is built for the total banking sector and for each individual bank.
Four types of risk are taken into account: credit risk, liquidity risk, protability risk and solvency risk.
3 In turn, each is measured by two criteria: credit risk, by means of the ratios overdue/gross-loans and unproductive/gross-loans; and liquidity risk through the ratio of deposits to gross-loans and the non-covered liabilities ratio (NCLR). The third subset of protability risk variables includes the return-on-assets (ROA) and return-onequity (ROE) measures. The nal set includes solvency and leverage risks, which capture the ability of an entity to meet its long-term commitments and to fund its projects, respectively. Annex A summarizes the denition of each risk and its specic source, while Annex B reports the descriptive statistics of this set of variables.
Regarding data, it should be noted that the banks in our sample have suered from mergers and acquisitions, and the statistical format that captures the information on banks has changed as well (e.g. changing of denitions and variables). Therefore, we have made statistical adjustments to the original data so as to consider all these points and, hence, to make the time series consistent throughout the sample period 4 . In addition, the original risk data exhibit numerous peaks in very short periods of time, which certainly generates noise. For this reason, the series were seasonally adjusted. Each of the nancial risk indicators of the banking total system is plotted in Figure 5 .
To construct the nancial fragility indicator, our technique starts by decomposing each risk into its trend and cyclical component using the Christiano and Fitzgerald lter (Christiano and Fitzgerald (2001) to a specic risk increased beyond its natural trend. We consider the highest peaks to be associated with periods of high risk exposure; hence, these periods entail phases of increased fragility.
Decomposition of each risk leads to time series that reveal several periods of fragility. This is because each risk evaluates a dierent aspect of the health of banks. Accordingly, we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to nd a common pattern among them.
More precisely, we perform PCA on the cyclical component of the eight risks described above.
5 The principal components are rotated using a Varimax rotation to obtain a better economic interpretation of our ndings. Once we complete the rotation, we select the number of principal components (PCs) that will be used to construct our nancial fragility dummy.
6 Table 1 reports the accumulated variance up to the 3-PC, which jointly explains 85% of the total variance in the data and a large proportion of almost all the risks.
In the last step, we dene banking fragility as those situations where the computed PC are above a threshold (Figure 6 ). I.e. our dummy variable takes the value of 1 in those cases and 0 otherwise. The threshold is xed (ad hoc) by using quantiles at 90% condence for each PC. The rst PC is an index that summarizes both credit and leverage risks. The second PC illustrates the inuence of liquidity and solvency risks, while the third PC involves protability risk. In order to check the robustness of this approach, we also compute our banking fragility dummy using alternative quantiles (95% and 85%). In doing so, we nd no substantial dierences in the results with both criteria. Figure 7 shows the periods of nancial fragility for the total banking system (grey areas), while Right-Panel compares these areas with the probability of credit booms. From the start of our sample (1996), we can distinguish three periods of relatively This gure shows the nancial fragility dummy for the total banking sector (Left Panel) and compares it (Right Panel) to the probability of credit boom (Solid line) found by Guarin et al (2014) .
Left-Panel in

Model
We employ a Bayesian averaging of logistic regression models to estimate the probability that the banking system as a whole or a particular bank is in a position of nancial fragility.
7 Such a position is aected, in particular, by loan funding sources. We consider the following logistic regression:
where v t = 1 if there is nancial fragility at month t and v t = 0 otherwise, α is the intercept, β is a R × 1 parameter vector, ε t is the error term and X T ×R is the set of covariates that capture the dierent sources of credits funding. To capture some macroeconomic factor that aects nancial vulnerability and that arises apart from the balance sheet, we include a leader indicator of economic activity as control variable z t . Taking into account the variables of equation (4) in section 2, we can rewrite 5 as
where rd t are the retail deposits, wf t the wholesale funds (both as shares of total liabilities) and s t the use of securities (as share of total credits). 89 let p(v t = 1 | θ;rd t , wf t , s t , z t ) be the probability of being in a situation of nancial fragility at time t, it can be dened as
7 This technique is used by Guarin et al. (2014) to estimate a probability of having a credit boom in Latin American emerging economies 8 We also use the variables rd and wf as a proportion of M2. Although the results are not shown, these do not change signicantly.
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where θ = [α β ] and F is the cumulative logistic distribution function.
To deal simultaneously with the BMA (Bayesian Model Averaging) and the parameter uncertainty in our estimation, we follow Guarin et al. (2014) based on Raftery (1995) and Raftery et al. (1997) . The data set is denoted by D and M = [M 1 , . . . , M K ] is the set of all models. So, M k is the k-th model considering a subset of the covariates which size is less or equal to R and θ k its associated parameter vector.
Rewriting 7 in a BMA context, we get
is the joint posterior probability and the equation as a whole is a weighted average of probabilities in equation (7). Those weights are given by p(θ
The reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) algorithm introduced by Green (1995) is used to estimate the BMA probability in equation (8) In order to compute a value of the BMA probability at which there is a clear signal of nancial fragility, we take a threshold value τ ∈ [0, 1] as the solution to the following minimization problem
where φ (τ ) is the proportion of nancial fragility's false alarms, γ (τ ) is the proportion of undetected fragility situations and γ is the maximum value of γ admitted by the policymaker.
The values of φ (τ ) and γ (τ ) are calculated as proportions of the total number of observations in the sample. That is
where 1 {·} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if condition {·} is satised, and 0 otherwise.
Note that for a given probability p v t = 1 | θ k ; D , the number of estimated periods of nancial fragility depends on the threshold τ . If the latter is very small, then we will 14 have many situations of nancial fragility that could be false alarms. On the contrary, if τ is very large, then we will have few warnings and the probability of having undetected periods of nancial fragility would be greater.
Results
Certain technical details should be highlighted before presenting the results. The probabilities of being in a situation of nancial fragility at time t are estimated on the set of computed data [v t , x t ], equation (6) where the dependent variable v t corresponds to the indicator estimated in section 3. The set of regressors x it includes both contemporary covariates and up to six (6) lags of each one. The BMA estimates are performed by means of a Markov chain with 220,000 draws where the rst 20,000 draws are burned-up to avoid the noise in the choice of the initial seed. We use a Reversible Jump Markov Chain
Monte Carlo method to simulate the draws, and the draw chains were constructed using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We assume the prior model probability is p (M k ) = 
Total Banking Sector
In the rst exercise we compute the logistic regression model (7) for the total banking sector. The BMA parameters are used to estimate the probabilities of being in a situation of nancial fragility. Figure 8 illustrates the results. The solid line displayed between 1996 and 2013 shows the estimated values of the probability, the gray areas correspond to periods of nancial fragility previously identied via the risks indicators, and the dashed line denes the threshold, which is estimated at 33%. With the latter percentage, the probability of detecting a period of nancial fragility is 88%, while the probability of having no false alarms is 82%.
The results exhibit an excellent t between the estimated probability and the identied periods of nancial fragility, and the adjustment is generally quite fast. This means probability takes high values when there are periods of nancial vulnerability, while it is close to zero when there is no fragility. The BMA probability, which depends on the resources for bank funding, identies seven episodes of nancial fragility. What is very interesting is that three of them are not captured by the risk-based dummy variable:
at the middle of 2003, in 2004 and, with a higher probability value at the end of 2011.
These ndings are very important, because they suggest that during these three periods, the banking system exhibited a signicant degree of vulnerability through its funding The estimated probability highlights two episodes of nancial fragility at the end of the 90s. The rst takes place in the second half of 1998 and at the begining of 1999.
Not surprisingly, these events coincide with the credit boom identied by Guarin et al. (2014) . After that, the probability declines to less than 20%. Subsequently, there is a rise in probability to very high values, showing new episodes of vulnerability; namely, in the second half of 1999 and the last quarter of 2000. These two episodes are captured by the dummy variable. As mentioned, these episodes are associated with one of the worst downturns in the Colombian economy, which ultimately led to a nancial crisis.
In the rst half of the 2000s, the BMA probability nds a new set of episodes of nancial fragility. However, they are not captured by the risk-based dummy variable.
The rst features a peak in the third quarter of 2002, which might be associated with the increase in market risk due to liquidity problems in the public debt market. The This table shows the most important variables on average for the Logistic Regression of the total banking sector, their probability of inclusion, their posterior mean and standard deviation and the probability of being positive.
the collateral eects of the international nancial crisis, which also had an impact on the Latin American economies. Concerning the nal years, we found the probability features a period of fragility between the second half of 2011 and the rst quarter of 2012.
Once again, the risk-based dummy variable is not able to capture this episode, which is associated mainly with a strong expansion in credit, coupled with capital inows and high asset prices. Not surprisingly, foreign resources are the main wholesale funds that explain the higher probability. Table 2 reports the posterior inclusion probability (PIP), the posterior mean, the posterior standard deviation, and the sign certainty, for all variables selected by BMA methodology as determinants of probability 10 . We denote the contemporary value and the i lags of the variable (·) as L i . The table shows the statistics for the 20 covariates with the highest PIP values for the model. According to this criterion, the most impor-10 The PIP stands for the probability that an explanatory variable is included in the model. The sign certainty presents the probability that the estimated coecient is positive. The increase in the credit funding sources such as foreign credit, interbank operations and credit from other domestic intermediaries, all of them being an important part of wholesale funds, has a positive eect on the probability of nancial fragility, as expected.
On the contrary, an increase in the use of securities, bond issuance, and a rise of economic activity, has a negative impact on the probability. The use of securities has the expected sign (see equation 6) conrming the hypothesis that the banking system uses resources from the sale of xed-income investments to fund loans.
Regarding the other two variables, we think that, for instance, in the middle of downturns, the income of households is negatively aected and borrowers have diculty in paying their debts, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the banking sector. This eect has a lag of six (6) months, while income is reduced and they start to abandon their obligations. We also presume that bond issuance could reect the health of nancial entities;
i.e., banks could issue bonds particularly when they are looking for funding to operate new projects instead of issuing bonds to fund new loans. Finally, we note that retail deposits do not appear as a determinant of the BMA probability, as expected. The above is because in periods of loan expansion (and fragility), these funds are not enough to cover the demand for bank lending, as remarked by literature. Consequently, banks make use of wholesale funds rather than traditional or retail deposits. This gure shows the most important 50 models for the total banking sector according to their PIP and the variables they include. 
Predicting nancial fragility episodes
The models computed in previous sections can be useful to predict the short term probability of being in an episode of nancial fragility at time t+h, based only on credit funding information up to time t. Note that h stands for the time horizon of our direct forecast.
This exercise provides a valuable tool for monitoring the short-term health of individual banks and the aggregate system in order to prevent possible episodes of nancial instability.
Specically, we carry out the BMA estimation of the logistic regression model v t+h = α + β X t + ε t for t = 1, . . . , T and h = 1, . . . , 6 . Once the parameters are estimated, we compute the probability p(v t+h = 1 | θ;rd t , wf t , b t , z t ).
Figure 10 plots both the in-sample estimate of the probability of nancial fragility for h=0 (i.e. solid line in Figure 8 ) and the results of our prediction for h = 1, . . . 6, (black points ). As mentioned above, each point represent the direct forecast of the probability at time T+h, given the data on credit funding sources up to time T = March of 2013, which is our last available date in the sample. For instance, with h = 6, we predict the probability of being in a fragility episode for September of 2013 (about 0,25). Figure 10 shows our entire set of predicted probabilities is below the estimated threshold for all time horizons; hence, there are not signals of banking instability in the short-term. This Figure shows six direct forecasts of the probability of nancial fragility from April to September 2013.
Individual Banks
The probability estimation for nancial fragility at the individual bank level uses a sample of 12 entities. With this exercise, we try to assess the eects of the funding strategy of each bank on its nancial fragility. The procedure also allows us to enhance the performance of our model in terms of the estimation. In addition, the individual fragility assessment becomes a useful tool for monitoring. Once again, all the BMA probabilities are estimated on the set of data [x i,t , v i,t ], where the dummy variable of nancial fragility was constructed for each bank following the description in Section 3.
We cluster our sample of nancial institutions in two groups: The rst group includes four large banks and the second one includes eight medium and small-size banks. The classication is based on their share of total assets. The large-size bank group accounts for 42.7% of the total assets of the banking system, while the medium-and small-size group account for 23.5%. This characterization allows us to analyze in detail the dynamics of nancial fragility and its relationship to credit funding sources between similar sized banks, in order to reduce the high heterogenity between them. Although the estimation is at an individual level, we want to generalize the conclusions at the group level.
Figures 11, 12 and 13 show the results of our individual estimation. For each bank, we plot (left column) the estimated BMA probability of nancial fragility (solid-line). This probability is compared to the risk indicator, which represents the periods of nancial fragility as described in 3. We also plot the threshold (dash line) computed for each bank.
Each panel includes a table (right column) with the BMA results: PIP, posterior mean, posterior standard deviation and sign certainty for the eight most important variables.
Large-size Banks Figure 11 shows that our method is able to capture the main periods of nancial fragility for large-size banks, as identied through the risk-based dummy variable. The t of our model, with respect to the periods of banking instability, is quite successful. Three of the four banks in the group have a threshold at around 22% and their probability of having no false alarms is equal to 77%. In particular, bank 3 has a very good t, which leads 5.2 Individual Banks 20 to a higher threshold of 48%, and better probability indicators. In fact, for this specic bank, the probability of detecting a period of nancial fragility is 99%.
In We also nd economic activity is an important covariate, according to their PIP. In three of four banks, this variable has a PIP near 100%. This result suggests fragility for this group of banks is related directly to changes in economic activity; i.e they are more vulnerable during recession periods, as expected. There are other covariates with an impact on the probability of fragility (e.g. foreign credit, investments substitution and interbank operations). In particular, banks 1, 3 and 4 are very similar in terms of the explanatory covariates of the nancial vulnerability, while bank 2 diers. For that bank, movements in foreign credit lead the dynamics of its probability of nancial fragility.
Medium and Small -size Banks
Figures 12 and 13 show the estimation results for medium and small-size banks, respectively. These results are quite similar compared to one another. Even though episodes of nancial fragility measured by risks are not uniform throughout the banks, in general, they are captured appropriately by BMA probability. However, the number of episodes computed by the probability for these groups of banks is distinct from those found for the aggregate banking system and even for large-size banks. For the medium-size banks, for instance, episodes of nancial fragility are more disperse over time and shorter. In the case of small-size banks, there are more areas highlighted as periods of instability, but their duration is also shorter than those for the total sector.
Although our model has a lower t in these cases, the exercises are able to capture the periods of nancial fragility highlighted by the gray areas computed in Section 3.
With the exception of Bank 6, the most important covariates to explain the instability of medium-size banks are interbank operations, foreign credit, and securities redemption.
For this group, the threshold is 15%, on average, and the probability of detecting nancial fragility periods is reduced to 62%. The emission of bonds is another important covariate within the analysis. As mentioned earlier, we assume this variable could provide signals of good health and using the resources obtained through bonds to expand the business instead of nancing credit. We also highlight, within the analysis, that economic actitivity is no longer a decisive variable for estimating the probability of nancial fragility. The PIP of all the variables is lower than the ones of large-size banks. These results indicate that variables are not completely decisive in the determination of the probability. For Bank 6, specically, our model does not provide a good t and the results are not conclusive.
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In the case of the small-size banks, the threshold probability is 19%, on average, and the probability of having no false alarms is 74%. Hence, the probability of detecting nancial fragility periods is 66%. The model is able to capture the nancial fragility This gure shows the results of the estimation for medium size banks. In the left column, we present the estimated probability compared to the risk indicator while the right column reports the most important explanatory variables and their statistics (i.e. PIP, posterior mean, standard deviation and sign certainty). This gure shows the results of the estimation for small size banks. In the left column, we present the estimated probability compared to the risk indicator while the right column reports the most important explanatory variables and their statistics (i.e. PIP, posterior mean, standard deviation and sign certainty).
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Panel Data with Fixed Eects
To take into account the individual characteristics of the full set of banks in our sample, we run a logistic regression model with panel data and xed eects adapting equation (7). Figure C .1 in Annex C shows the results of the estimation. Each panel in this gure presents the estimated BMA probability for one bank compared to its own nancial fragility areas (based on risks). Once again, the estimated probability is denoted as a thin solid line and the threshold probability is plotted as a dash line.
In general, we see the estimated probability of nancial fragility coming from funding sources does not have a good t with respect to the predened episodes based on risks.
Given the low t, the computed threshold probability is set at 17% to keep a maximum tolerance of 5% of undetected episodes of fragility. In addition, we found a very low probability of having no false alarms.
We must bear in mind that episodes of fragility identied specially for medium and small banks are a bit dierent from those identied for the total sector. Moreover, credit funding sources also have distinct dynamics among banks. In fact, the results of our exercise with panel data and xed eects show the heterogeneity among banks is too high, and trying to summarize their individual characteristics in a set of particular covariates with a good t of the data is a dicult task. Hence, the high heterogeneity found in the data for individual banks with respect to nancial fragility areas and credit funding sources led us to use the approach based on the estimation of individual logistic regression models for each bank.
Conclusions
The Colombian banking sector is relatively small, not quite open internationally, and is in a process of deepening. Currently, total banking assets are over one-third of GDP (40%), which is the average for Latin American emerging economies. The increasing use of wholesale funding to support bank loans, particularly for some phases of credit expansion, could be a new characteristic of the banking system. This feature, in turn, probably means a greater nancial fragility during these periods, which needs to be monitored carefully in the interest of having a sound nancial system.
The previous conclusions arise from this paper, which provides empirical support on the relationship between the funding sources of credit and the nancial fragility of the Colombian banking system. In particular, we were interested in exploring how the increasing use of wholesale funding to support bank loans, especially in credit expansion phases, is a potential source of nancial instability. Among the wholesale accounts with greater impact we identify foreign credits, interbank short-term operations and bond issuance.
Regarding methodological details, our data set contains monthly balance sheets from December 1996 to March 2013 at both levels: the aggregated banking system and individual entities (12 banks which account 65% of total banking assets). Our empirical estrategy rst implied dening a statistical model to measure the nancial fragility via the standard risks indicator and, subsequently, to carry out the logistic time series and panel 26 data regressions, based on Bayesian technique, to estimate and predict the probability of episodes of banking fragility based on loan funding sources. In the rst step we employed an ample set of indicators to capture the main four risk categories: credit risk, liquidity risk, protability risk and solvency risk.
Our model identies seven episodes of nancial fragility since 1996. What is truly a novel result is that three of them are not captured by the standard risk indicators, i.e., there were three episodes during which the banking system exhibited a signicant degree of vulnerability on the basis of its funding sources, but these situations were not captured by the standard risks indicators. Consequently, changes in funds used for lending could be a potential source of nancial instability, and monitoring them could be a complementary tool to assess their state of fragility. This suggestion is highly important for policymakers and greatly relevant for policy discussions on regulation of nancial institutions. Even though the exercise is performed for the Colombian banking system, it could serve as reference to be applied to other emerging economies.
Finally, the ndings noted in this paper seem to be in line with a burgeoning amount of recent literature that associates both credit cycles and nancial stability with the dynamics of bank lending. According to this literature, traditional retail deposits are not enough to cover the demand for lending during phases of credit expansion; hence, banks access wholesale funds as alternative funding sources. We call attention to the fact that, apart from the Korean case, the empirical analysis on this subject in emerging economies has been limited. This graph shows the results of a logistic regression with panel data and xed eects. Each panel illustrates the estimated probability of each bank being in a situation of nancial fragility and compares it with their own risk-based vulnerability. 
